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INDEMNITY UNDER WORKERS'
COMPENSATION: RECOGNIZING A
SPECIAL LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN MANUFACTURER
AND EMPLOYER
As Professor Arthur Larson once noted, in one of the most often
quoted observations on the subject of workers' compensation, "[p]erhaps
the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of compensation law is the
question whether a third party in an action by the employee can get con-
tribution or indemnity from the employer, when the employer's negli-
gence has caused or contributed to the [employee's] injury."' Both state
and federal workers' compensation acts contain exclusive-remedy provi-
sions that limit an employer's liability to the payment of workers' com-
pensation benefits;2 the question, however, is to what extent these
limitations affect a third party's traditional rights of contribution or in-
demnity from other negligent parties.
Workers' compensation creates an equation that roughly balances
the sacrifices by and benefits to both employers and employees. Employ-
ees receive faster and virtually certain recovery, while sacrificing their
claims against employers; employers assume a new liability, while being
relieved of large damage verdicts.3 This balance, however, fails to ac-
1. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAWS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.11, at 14-561 (1987).
2. Three types of "exclusive liability" clauses are generally found in workers' compensation
legislation:
(a) The "Massachusetts Type, which only says that the employee, by coming within the act,
waives his common law rights." This type is the most narrow and the least common.
(b) The "California and Michigan Type, which says that the employer's liability shall be 'ex-
clusive,' or that he shall have 'no other liability whatsoever.'"
(c) The New York Type, which specifies "that the excluded actions include those by 'such
employee, his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on account of injury or
death.'" The types listed at (b) and (c) are the most common.
See id §§ 66.10-66.22 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West 1966); MicH. COMP. LAWS § 411.4
(1968); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1968)). Decisions concerning recovery of third
parties usually have not turned on the language of the statutes. See United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 273 Or. 162, 167 n.2, 539 P.2d 1065, 1067 n.2 (1975).
3. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 65.11, at 12-9.
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count for the rights and interests of third parties such as manufacturers.4
Many state workers' compensation acts explicitly state that the right of
an employee to bring an action against a third party is not removed by
the act.5 If an employee takes advantage of this right to sue third parties,
and the third party then tries to assert its own claim for contribution or
indemnity against a negligent employer, the third party often finds the
exclusive-remedy provision an insurmountable hurdle.6 Legislatures
have not included third-party interests as a variable when formulating
workers' compensation schemes. Consequently, unlike employees, third
parties receive no benefits in exchange for the sacrifice of their claims
against employers.7
It is not surprising-in light of the inequitable statutory treatment
of third-party claims-that courts often struggle with the workers' com-
pensation equation in an attempt to balance the interests of all parties on
the scales of justice and at the same time remain faithful to legislative
intent. Authorities are divided as to whether a given state's exclusive-
remedy provision operates as an absolute bar to all claims against em-
ployers8 or merely governs rights between employers and their employ-
ees. In the latter case, third parties are free to pursue independent
4. See generally Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 368, 215 N.W.2d 615, 619 (1974) (work-
men's compensation act intended only to control rights between employer and employee (quoting
Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 364, 63 N.W.2d 355, 365 (1954))); Weisgall, Product Liabil-
ity in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third
Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1035, 1081 (arguing that manufacturers should be made part of workers'
compensation system); Comment, The Effect of Workers' Compensation Laws on the Right of a Third
Party Liable to an Injured Employee to Recover Contribution or Indemnity from the Employer, 9
SETON HALL L. REV. 238, 241 (1978) ("[W]orkers' compensation law governs the employer's liabil-
ity to the employee [while] general tort law governs the third party's liability to the employee.").
5. For example, in New Jersey:
Where a third person is liable to the employee or his dependents for an injury or
death, the existence of a right of compensation from the employer or insurance carrier
under this statute shall not operate as a bar to the action of the employee or his dependents,
nor be regarded as establishing a measure of damage therein.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1987).
6. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. The third party may assert its claim for indemnity
either before or after adjudication of the employee's claim against it.
7. Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 363, 63 N.W.2d 355, 365 (1954) (third party gains
nothing from workers' compensation scheme); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.11, at 14-563
(third party a stranger to compensation system).
8. Alabama is the only state that holds that its workers' compensation act bars any and all
claims by third parties against employers due to injured employees' recovery from third parties. See
Paul Krebs & Assoc. v. Matthews & Fritts Constr. Co., 356 So. 2d 638, 640 (Ala. 1978) (workers'
compensation statute proteets employer from suit by third party seeking indemnity from employer
under contractual provisions). A federal court interpreting Tennessee law has made a similar inter-
pretation of the Tennessee workers' compensation act. See Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co. v.
Eichleay Corp., 708 F.2d 1055, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) (affirming denial of third-party indemnity ac-
tion due to previous broad interpretations of the exclusive-remedy provision of Tennessee workers'
compensation act).
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claims. A third party's right to contribution or indemnity must be ad-
dressed in this context. 9
The inequities of strict application of the workers' compensation ex-
clusive-remedy provision have multiplied with the development of prod-
ucts liability theory. A manufacturer is now held strictly liable for a
Several other states, including Nevada and Oregon, have statutes that, in addition to the exclu-
sive-remedy provision, bar all third-party claims against an employer under workers' compensation.
See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 616.265 (Michie 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018 (1987). Other
states, such as California, Pennsylvania and Texas, have statutes that allow recovery only when there
is a specific written agreement to that effeet between a manufacturer and an employer. See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3864 (West 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988). See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§§ 76.44- 76.45 (listing state statutes that provide no right of recovery against employer by a third
person in absence of written agreement).
9. A majority of state high courts as well as the United States Supreme Court have held that
state and federal workers' compensation acts were intended to govern only the rights of employees,
their relatives and people claiming through them or on behalf of them. See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 199 (1983) ("FECA's exclusive-liability provision does not
directly bar a third-party indemnity action against the United States." (citation omitted)); Oaklawn
Jockey Club, Inc. v. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 251 Ark. 1100, 1101-02, 477 S.W.2d 477, 478 (1972)
(Workers' compensation does not abolish third party's right to implied indemnity.); Arcidiacono v.
Wilmington Finishing Co., No. 84C-AU-86 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,
Del file) ("Delaware law clearly recognized contractual claims of indemnity against an employer by
third parties as an exeeption to the [workers' compensation] exclusivity principle."), cert. denied, 516
A.2d 482 (Del. 1986); Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1979) (initially
valid indemnity claim proper in spite of workers' compensation); Hirasha v. Burtner, 702 P.2d 772,
774 (Haw. 1985) (indemnity allowed if based on contract or other independent duty to indemnify);
Burgdorff v. International Business Machs., 35 Ill. App. 3d 192, 194, 341 N.E.2d 122, 124-25 (1975)
(to invoke implied indemnity, must show either a preexisting relationship between the parties or a
qualitative difference between the two parties' negligence); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr.
Co., 259 Iowa 314, 322-23, 144 N.W.2d 303, 308 (1966) (indemnity permitted for express contracts,
vicarious liability or breach of an independent duty running from employer to third party); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Sweco, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (indemnity claims under
workers' compensation may be maintained); Decker v. Black & Deeker Mfg. Co., 389 Mass. 35, 38,
449 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1983) (question of right to indemnity under workers' compensation based on
implied contract left undecided); Grayson v. Chambersburg Eng'g Co., 139 Mich. App. 456, 460-61,
362 N.W.2d 751, 754 (1984) (implied contract of indemnity recognized); Lambertson v. Cincinnati
Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 127, 257 N.W.2d 679, 687-88 (1977) (might allow indemnity if third party not
at fault; contribution allowed); Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus., 103 N.J. 177, 188-89, 510 A.2d
1152, 1158 (1986) (indemnity allowed when special relationship exists between employer and third
party, and latter is only vicariously liable); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 152-53, 282
N.E.2d 288, 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 390 (1972) (indemnity allowed based on independent legal
duty); Harter Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526, 528 (Okla. 1979) (indemnity allowed if
independent relationship exists between employer and third party); Boldman v. Mt. Hood Chem.
Corp., 288 Or. 121, 129, 602 P.2d 1072, 1076 (1979) (indemnity allowed if special legal relationship
exists); Olch v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 19 Wash. App. 89, 93, 573 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1978) (Indem-
nity is permitted (1) if there is a breach of an independent duty between an employer and a third
party, (2) if there is vicarious liability, or (3) because of the passive negligence of a third party as
compared to active negligence of an employer.); Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W. Va.
440, 446, 288 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1982) (implied indemnity allowed, but only when third party without
fault). See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, supp. at 190-92 (Dec. 1987) (citing more recent
cases for § 76.81, at 14-734 n.22).
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defective product put into the flow of commerce; 10 when a manufacturer
of machinery discovers a defect in its product, it incurs a nondelegable
duty both to cure the defect and to warn users of the defect's existence."
Occasionally, however, an employer will decline a manufacturer's offer
to install a curative device even after being fully informed of the
machine's defect,1 2 and an employee of this negligent owner will injure
himself on the defective machine in precisely the manner anticipated by
the manufacturer. The injured employee automatically receives workers'
compensation benefits from the employer, and the exclusive-remedy pro-
vision extinguishes all other claims against the employer resulting from
that particular injury.1 3 The injured employee may, however, proceed
against the manufacturer with a products liability claim alleging that the
original defect was the proximate cause of the injury, and despite its
good-faith efforts to cure, the manufacturer may still be found liable to
10. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer... is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer...
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relationship with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). A product is defective when it is in a condition
not contemplated by the user that is unreasonably dangerous. Id § 402A comment g; see also Dor-
sey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (manufacturer liable if product unreasona-
bly dangerous); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 700 (1963) (manufacturer strictly liable for injuries resulting from defective article placed on the
market). A danger is unreasonable when it is foreseeable. See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d
1304, 1308-11 (5th Cir. 1980); Balido v. Improved Mach., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 895 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)
(manufacturer has duty to warn of latent nonobvious dangers and of defects in products); Stephen-
son v. R.A. Jones & Co., 103 N.J. 194, 216, 510 A.2d 1161, 1172 (1986) (If a defect is discovered
after a sale, a manufacturer has a duty either to remedy the defect or to give users adequate
warnings.).
12. See Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14
DuQ. L. REV. 349, 375-76 (1976) (employers may remain unpersuaded as to merits of design defect
correction). Possible reasons for the employer's refusal may include the undesirability of halting
production-even temporarily-while the safety device is installed, the knowledge that the safety
device may decrease the machine's productivity, the general attitude that the device is a "hassle"
that need not be contended with, or the fecling that the device is unnecessary because no injury has
yet occurred. Cf Derosa v. Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762, 764, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(employer abused product to suit his own needs); Noonan v. Spring Creek Forest Prods., 700 P.2d
623, 624 (Mont. 1985) (employer told plaintiff not to turn off defective planer because it would slow
down production); Duk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809, 811, 556 P.2d 683, 684
(1976) (dead-man switch, a safety device, replaced by standard switch when employee complained).
13. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 65.31, at 12-21 (employer relieved of all other liability if
injury covered by workers' compensation); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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that employee for the injury. 14 The manufacturer, in turn, might pursue
a claim for contribution or indemnity against the uncooperative em-
ployer, arguing that "but for" the actions of the employer the accident
would never have occurred.15 Unfortunately, mechanical application of
the exclusive-remedy provision of workers' compensation results in dis-
missal of the manufacturer's claim. This result could be extended to ab-
surd lengths: an employer, under some statutory schemes, might be
entitled to reimbursement from a manufacturer for any workers' com-
pensation payments, 16 creating the possibility that an employer could es-
cape all liability even though he prevented any correction of faulty
machinery.
Although dismissing the manufacturer's claim in such a situation
may seem bizarre, it was the result in the recently decided Stephenson v.
R.A. Jones & Co. 17 In Stephenson, a manufacturer had sent letters to all
owners of its machines informing them of a discovered defect and asking
them to install the safety device that was being forwarded to them at no
cost. The manufacturer shipped some of these safety devices to the par-
ticular employer, but the employer never installed the devices. The
safety device cost $300 (which the manufacturer absorbed) and took less
than thirty minutes of minimal labor to install.18 Five years later, while
inspecting the employer's plant, the manufacturer discovered that the
curative safety devices had never been installed. The manufacturer re-
newed efforts to cure the employer's defective machines. Four letters
and two offers to send new devices were ignored. An injury then oc-
curred. The injured worker successfully sought damages from the manu-
facturer. The manufacturer then sought indemnity from the employer
asserting that the employer frustrated attempts to cure the machinery
once the defect was discovered.
The dissenting opinion in the New Jersey Supreme Court argued
that the issue of the employer's lack of cooperation should have been
14. The manufacturer may be found liable on the basis of a jury determination that the em-
ployer's refusal to have the curative device installed was a "foreseeable consequence" of placing the
defective machine into a flow of commerce and therefore does not relieve the manufacturer of liabil-
ity. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text. Additionally, the court might direct a verdict
against the manufacturer. See, eg., Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., 103 N.J. 194, 218 n.17, 510
A.2d 1161, 1173 n.17 (1986) (Stein, J., dissenting).
15. W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 41, at 266 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
16. See Mitchell, supra note 12, at 362 n.42, 370 (right of subrogation for negligent employer
under debate); Weisgall, supra note 4, at 1046-49 (absolute subrogation for employer regardless of
fault "inconsistent" with principles of subrogation and negligence). See generally 2A A. LARSON,
supra note 1, and §§ 71.20, 74.10-74.15 (avoiding double rccovery; mechanics of subrogation).
17. 103 N.J. 194, 510 A.2d 1161 (1986).
18. Id. at 202, 510 A.2d at 1165 (Stein, J., dissenting).
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submitted to the jury; if the jury found the employer frustrated a legiti-
mate attempt by the manufacturer to cure the defective product, the in-
demnity claim should lie.19 The majority, however, disagreed, holding
that because the jury found the manufacturer to be five percent at fault,
the claim for indemnity could not override the exclusive-remedy provi-
sion of the workers' compensation act and the manufacturer's claim was
dismissed.20
This note first examines the rationale of allowing a jury to decide the
question of liability when a manufacturer is prevented from curing
machine defects by the negligent or reckless conduct of an employer.21
Next, the note addresses manufacturers' alternatives of contribution or
indemnity against such uncooperative employers. 22 The note argues that
in these situations manufacturers have legitimate claims for indemnity
from employers due to the breach of an independent duty running from
the employer to the manufacturer to allow the manufacturer to cure
machine defects.23 This duty is based on common law tort principles and
is supported by public policy.24 The note concludes that allowing indem-
nity for the breach of an employer's duty to a manufacturer is neither
barred by workers' compensation acts nor judicially contrived to under-
mine such acts, but rather promotes an overall legislative scheme of
safety in the workplace. 25
I. MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY AS A QUESTION OF
FORESEEABILITY FOR THE JURY
A manufacturer will be held strictly liable for putting into com-
merce a machine that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to its user.26
The injured user need only show that the machine was defective when it
left the manufacturer's control and that this defect caused the injury sus-
tained.27 Likewise, a manufacturer has a duty to cure any subsequently
discovered defects in its machines because failure to correct such defects
19. Id. at 218, 510 A.2d at 1173 (Stein, J., dissenting). Whether the employer did in fact frus-
trate attempts to cure was unclear, but the majority decided that this issue did not create a jury
question. Id. at 199-200, 510 A.2d at 1163-64.
20. Id. at 199, 510 A.2d at 1163. The idea that indemnity is only available to a party held liable
through no personal fault is addressed infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 45-145 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 82-145 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 90-123 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 124-45 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
27. See, eg., Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1983).
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also subjects a user to an unreasonable risk of harm.28
An exception to this general rule exists if a manufacturer can show
that, in any particular situation, its conduct was not the proximate cause
of the user's injuries.29 The manufacturer would argue that it took all
reasonable steps to cure the discovered defect and that the employer's
refusal to implement or install the corrective measures or devices was the
actual cause of the injury. A manufacturer thwarted in its curative steps
by an employer could argue that the duty of the manufacturer to the
employee/user was interrupted by the negligent (or willful) conduct of
the employer. In other words, the employer's actions became the super-
seding and intervening cause of the injury. These actions break the
causal chain between the product and the injury and relieve a manufac-
turer of liability.30
Despite the logic of such an argument, it is often unsuccessful in a
jury trial.31 As a matter of law, only those intervening causes that are
not foreseeable consequences of a manufacturer's breach of duty to an
employee/user will absolve the manufacturer of liability.32 As the finder
of fact, the jury is usually asked in these cases to determine whether the
manufacturer could reasonably foresee that an employer would resist at-
28. See, ag., La Belle v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1981) (manufacturer
held liable for failure to warn of need to modify airplane propeller when need discovered after sale);
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir.) (manufacturer held liable
if defects not remedied or adequate warnings not given), cert denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969).
29. Proximate cause is both a cause in fact of the injury (a factor which contributed to the
injury) and the legal cause of the injury (the factor for which the courts will impose liability). PROS-
SER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 42, at 272-73.
30. Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1322 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Superseding
cause [is] an act by a third person ... which by its intervention prevents a negligent person from
being held liable for harm to another."); Mitchell, supra note 12, at 369 (same). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts states:
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself. . does not make it a
superseding cause of harm to another. . . , if
(a) the [original negligent] actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized
that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man . . . would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third
person had so acted.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965).
31. See Mitchell, supra note 12, at 370 (jury may overlook technicalities of causation in order
to compensate an employee deserving sympathy); cf Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d
1, 8-9, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1974) (jury-when presented with substantial credible evidence from
both sides-ruled against the manufacturer and for the consumer in defective design case); Duke v.
Gulf& Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404,414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming jury verdict in favor
of employee and against manufacturer in products liability case although conflicting evidence on
question of foreseeability).
32. See, e.g., Toth v. Yoder Co., 749 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1984) (intervening negligence
of third party does not relieve manufacturer of liability unless the third party's acts or omissions are
unforeseeable); Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) (same);
Mitchell, supra note 12, at 369 (same).
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tempts to cure the machine once a defect was discovered.33 If the jury
finds that the employer's noncooperation was a foreseeable consequence
of putting a defective machine into the flow of commerce, the employer's
conduct does not cut off the manufacturer's liability to the employee.34
At the same time, the employer is immune from any tort suit brought by
the employee, and in the event that the employee recovers from the man-
ufacturer, the employer could even be reimbursed for any workers' com-
pensation payments made.35
The possibility of allowing the question to be decided as a matter of
law has appealed to some courts.36 A closer look at workers' compensa-
tion, however, reveals that under its present structure, the foreseeability
question must be left to the jury. If an employer's refusal to take curative
measures is ruled, as a matter of law, to be a superseding and intervening
cause of an employee's injuries, then the manufacturer is relieved of lia-
bility and the employee must look to the employer for compensation.
Exclusive-remedy provisions, however, bar any recovery by an employee
that exceeds the workers' compensation payments. 37 This present struc-
ture, therefore, would assume a policy decision that employees should
bear most of the loss when originally defective products go uncured due
to the employers' noncooperation. This result not only offends any sense
of justice, it also is contrary to both the traditional products liability
scheme of allocating cost 38 and the traditional idea that one who is at
33. See, e.g., Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1985) (determinations
of proximate cause and foreseeable risk present jury questions); Toth, 749 F.2d at 1196 (whether
employer's modification of machine constitutes superseding cause is jury question); Gracyalny, 723
F.2d at 1323 (foreseeability of employer's acts is a jury question); Herman v. Welland Chem., Ltd.,
580 F. Supp. 823, 828 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (superseding cause presents questions that are normally for
jury); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 645, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 899 (1972)
(extent to which manufacturers are required to anticipate safety neglect presents issue of fact). But
see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Toth, 749 F.2d at 1197 (jury found manufacturer negligent because modifications
in design made by plaintiff's employer were "foreseeable"); Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d
169, 177 (Miss. 1974) (affirming judge's finding of manufacturer's liability despite negligent omission
of dealer in failing to heed manufacturer's warning); cf DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 509
F. Supp. 762, 768-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (jury verdict finding manufacturer of handgun liable for pro-
duction of defective firearm overturned because fellow officer's misnse of the firearm was not foresee-
able as matter of law).
35. See Mitchell, supra note 12, at 370; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Meuller v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 494 F. Supp. 275, 277, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (proxi-
mate cause normally jury question but when there is no factual dispute, court properly should rule
on issue; finding employer's conduct superseding cause); Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261
Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971) (manufacturer's warning and attempts to cure insulated him from
liability as matter of law); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 404, 192 S.W.2d 840, 845
(1946) (whether ignoring of offered remedy by intermediate owner constituted a superseding cause
was decided by the court).
37. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 65.11, at 12-1.
38. Prosser states the idea of risk-bearing allocation:
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fault should bear the cost of injury.39
Leaving the determination of foreseeability to the jury places the
question of responsibility where it belongs-between manufacturers who
create defective machines and employers whose noncooperation prevents
such machines from being corrected. This scheme also prevents innocent
employees from bearing the cost of injury. Once found liable,4° a manu-
facturer should not be precluded from receiving reimbursement from the
employer 41 if the employer was truly noncooperative. 42 Such reimburse-
ment comports with the idea that one who is at fault should bear the
cost.43 While the stymied manufacturer should be able to collect from
the employer, in the event that the claim fails44 or the employer is insol-
vent, the ultimate risk of liability should fall on the manufacturer instead
of the employee. Such a result would parallel the policy behind products
liability.
II. MANUFACTURERS' POSSIBILITY OF RECOVERY FROM EMPLOYERS
WHO THWART EFFORTS TO CURE
Once a manufacturer is frustrated in efforts to cure and is held liable
for the employee's injury resulting from the uncured defect, the manufac-
turer should be able to proceed against the employer who thwarted the
curative attempts. Under theoretical principles of tort law, the manufac-
turer has two options: contribution4 5 or indemnity.46 In practice, how-
ever, the exclusive-remedy provisions in most state workers'
compensation acts foreclose the contribution option and leave indemnity
as the only viable alternative.
The costs of damaging events due to defectively dangerous products can best be borne by
the enterprisers who make and sell these products. Those who are merchants and espe-
cially those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise have the capacity to distribute the
losses of the few among the many who purchase the product[] ... by charging higher
prices for the costs of products.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 98, at 692-93 (footnote omitted).
39. See, eg., Bullock v. Black & Decker, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("prin-
ciple... of restitution, requir[es] that everyone be responsible for his own negligence").
40. Most juries find against the manufacturer in these cases. See supra note 34 and accompany-
ing text.
41. See infra notes 82-145 and accompanying text.
42. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 71.10, at 14-1 ("[E]very mature loss-adjusting mechanism
... must make the injured person whole, and it must... seek out the true wrongdoer whenever
possible.").
43. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
44. Such a claim should fail, for instance, where the employer's actions may not have been so
reprehensible or where the manufacturer's attempts to cure may not have been so persistent. See,
eg., Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 177 (Miss. 1974) (manufacturer sent out ouly one
written warning-ignoring it not reprehensible).
45. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 60-93 and accompanying text.
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A. Contribution.
Contribution is a statutory or common law remedy that allows dam-
ages among joint tortfeasors to be apportioned according to the degree of
fault of each tortfeasor.47 For a claim of contribution, both parties must
be jointly liable in tort so that a common liability is imposed upon
them.48 This common law requirement is codified in the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which defines joint tortfeasors as "two
or more persons [who] become jointly or severally liable in tort."'49
At first glance, it would seem that both a manufacturer who places a
defective machine in the market and an employer who refuses to allow
the defect to be corrected contribute proportionately to an employee's
injuries. In such a case, contribution would be the appropriate remedy
for a manufacturer. Under contribution, a manufacturer would collect
an amount equal to an employer's proportion of fault.50 Workers' com-
pensation, however, extinguishes all tort liability of employers to their
employees.5' Employers' liability is statutory while manufacturers' lia-
bility is tort-based. 52 Because an employer is not "jointly or severally"
liable in tort with a manufacturer and because their acts do not form a
common liability, an employer is not considered a joint tortfeasor.
Therefore, an employer is not open to a claim of contribution s
Although this result may seem harsh and counterintuitive, 54 most
47. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 128, 257 N.W. 2d 679, 688 (1977); PROS-
SER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 51, at 341.
48. See, eg., American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 1950); Hendrick-
son v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 371, 104 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1960).
49. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACr § l(a), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1955).
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Kittleson, 179 F.2d at 951 ("Because of
the [compensation] Act [the employee] has no common law action in tort against [the employer] as a
result of his injuries ....").
52. See Kittleson, 179 F.2d at 951 (employee's right to rccover from employer based on com-
pensation act while right to recover from manufacturer based on tort law; therefore "no common
source of liability" existed between employer and manufacturer); Speck v. Unit Handling Div., Lit-
ton Sys., 366 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1985) (denial of contribution based on lack of common liability
between third party and employer); see also Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Com-
pensation Employer, 1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 488 ("The claim of the employee against the employer is
solely for statutory benefits; his claim against the third person is for damages.").
53. Larson, supra note 52, at 488.
54. See, eg., Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., 103 N.J. 194, 199, 510 A.2d 1161, 1163 (1986)
("legislative scheme may seem harsh"). In fact, several state courts have attempted to alleviate "the
sometimes harsh effects of the employer's immnrity." See iad at 205-07, 510 A.2d at 1166-67 (Stein,
J., dissenting) (citing Larson, supra note 52, at 491-500). These attempts, as listed in Stephenson,
include:
[Tihe former "Pennsylvania Rule" (contribution by employer permissible because contri-
bution between joint tortfeasors depends on joint negligence rather than joint liability); the
Minnesota Rule... (contribution by employer permitted in proportion to fault but not in
excess of workers' compensation liability); the California and North Carolina approach
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courts have been reluctant to disregard the legislative intent to extinguish
employers' tort liability toward their employees."5 Unless an employer
can be said to be originally liable to an injured employee, contribution is
not available.5 6 Although employer immunity from contribution has
generated much criticism,57 and has caused various commentators to
propose comparative fault systems,58 the language of the statutes is
clear.59 Until the statutory language of exclusive-remedy provisions is
changed, contribution is not a possible remedy.
B. Indemnity.
Indemnity is the common law remedy that shifts the loss from the
one who has been forced to pay it to another who should bear it in-
stead.6° In other words, the one most at fault should be the one to pay.61
(where employer's negligence contributed to the injury, the employee's third-party recov-
ery is reduced by the amount of the compensation awarded); the "Murray Credit" rule
(employee's judgment against third party tortfeasor should be reduced by employer's pro
rata share after employee's recovery against employer under workers' compensation act);
the New York rule... (employer required to indemnify third-party tortfeasor based on
employer's degree of fault in causing employee's injury); and the Illinois rule... (employer
liable for contribution based on degree of fault and amount of contribution not limited by
employer's obligation under worker's compensation law).
Id at 205-06, 510 A.2d at 1167 (Stein, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
55. Many courts and commentators have criticized the contribution remedy in this situation
because "'allowance of such recovery over accomplishes indirectly what cannot be done directly
and, therefore, evades the spirit of the legislation.'" Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn.
114, 129, 257 N.W.2d 679, 688 (1977) (quoting Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's
Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 351, 419 (1970)); see also Stephenson, 103 N.J. at
206-07, 510 A.2d at 1167 (Stein, J., dissenting) (noting same criticism); cf. Rupe v. Durbin Durco,
Inc., 557 S.W.2d 742, 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) (making same criticism of indemnity claims). For
an extensive list of cases disallowing contribution, see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.20. See
also Prather v. Upjohn Co., 585 F. Supp. 112, 113-14 (N.D. Fla. 1984) (Manufacturer has no right
of contribution against third party because the parties cannot be jointly or severally liable as required
by Florida statute.); Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus., 103 N.J. 177, 183-85, 510 A.2d 1152, 1155-
56 (1986) ("The New Jersey Rule is consistent with that of the great majority of jurisdictions, which
hold that the [workmen's compensation] precludes a elaim for contribution against an employer
.... ",).
56. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 50, at 339-40.
57. See, e.g., Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 119-30, 257 N.W.2d at 684-89; Davis, Third-Party
Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation-Covered Employers Are Negligent-Where Do Dole and
Sunspan Lead?, 74 HoFsTRA L. REv. 571 (1976); Mitchell, supra note 12, at 364-65, 395-97; Weis-
gall, supra note 4, at 1049-50; Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L.
REv. 490, 516 (1969); Comment, supra note 4, at 298-99.
58. See, eg., Davis, supra note 57, at 580-83; Mitchell, supra note 12, at 395-97; Comment,
supra note 4, at 300-03.
59. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.20, at 14-594 ("The claim of the employee against the
employer is solely for statutory benefits .... " (emphasis added)).
60. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 51 (4th ed. 1971).
61. Cf Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., 103 N.J. 194, 208, 510 A.2d 1161, 1168 (1986) (Stein,
3., dissenting). This definition becomes important later. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying
text.
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Most courts recognize third-party contractual indemnity claims against
negligent employers who participate in workers' compensation if the in-
demnity agreement is unambiguously expressed in the contract.62 Even
in the absence of an express agreement, many courts allow some form of
a third-party indemnity claim under workers' compensation. 63
Implied indemnity can rest on one of two concepts. The first con-
cept allows indemnity under the common law principle that when one
party is compelled to pay fbr another's wrong, the party without fault
should be able to recover from the party whose negligence caused the
injury.64 This concept allows indemnification of employers under work-
ers' compensation in some jurisdictions when a third party is either vicar-
iously liable65 for another's negligence, or when a third party's conduct
"passively" contributes to an injury while the employer's action "ac-
tively" causes the injury. 66
The second concept of indemnification is based on the established
principle that if a person breaches a duty owed to another and the breach
causes injury, that person should compensate the one to whom the duty
was owed.67 Under workers' compensation this duty would run from
employers to manufacturers. In order to comport with the exclusive-
remedy provisions, this duty would need to be independent of any poten-
tial liability of an employer toward an employee. In other words, the
manufacturer/employer relationship must be found to exist separately
from an employer's relationship with an employee. 68 This second con-
62. See Larson, supra note 52, at 500-01 & n.79.
63. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
64. See Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 208, 510 A.2d at 1168 (Stein, J., dissenting); Sydenstricker v.
Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W. Va. 440, 445, 288 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1982).
65, Vicarious liability occurs when one party is held responsible for the acts of another due to
some relationship existing between the parties. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 69, at 499.
66. Passive negligence is found in mere nonfeasance (as opposed to misfeasance), such as the
failure to perform a duty imposed by law. It is contrasted with active negligence where the indemni-
tee has personally participated in an affirmative negligent act or an omission. See Rossmoor Sanita-
tion, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 629, 532 P.2d 97, 101, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453 (1975).
Passive/active negligence is also referred to as secondary/primary negligence. See Olch v. Pacific
Press & Shear Co., 19 Wash. App. 89, 93, 573 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1978).
67. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 53.
68. Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010, 1018-19 (D.R.I. 1977) ("The implied obliga-
tion to indemnify mnst rest on a particular duty the employer... owes to the manufacturer, distinct
from the duty he owes to his employees."), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440
U.S. 916 (1979); Bonus Bilt, Inc. v. United Grocers, Ltd., 136 Cal. App. 3d 429, 437, 186 Cal. Rptr.
357, 361 (1982) (no justification for shielding employer from liability if injury arises from relation-
ship distinct from employer's duties to employees); Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 207, 510 A.2d at 1167
(Stein, J., dissenting) (clash with employer immunity under workers' compensation less direct when
duty is "extricable from the tortious conduct that caused the injury"); Mitchell, supra note 12, at 383
(compensation statutes do not bar claims by third party founded on an employer's duty to third
party which is extraneous to employer/employee relationship).
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cept finds subtle application in the context of a manufacturer's claim
against an uncooperative employer who is otherwise protected by work-
ers' compensation. 69
1. Vicarious Liability and Active/Passive Negligence. A manufac-
turer who has produced a defective machine cannot seek indemnity from
a concurrently negligent employer under a theory of vicarious liability
when an employee is injured by the machine. The true basis of vicarious
liability is largely a public or social policy determination that, irrespec-
tive of fault, the parties stand in such a relationship that one should be
held to respond for the acts of another. 70 Under the products liability
scheme, a manufacturer becomes liable for any injury caused by placing a
defective product on the market. The act of placing a defective machine
into the flow of commerce is independent of any subsequent conduct on
the part of the employer. Thus, a manufacturer's liability is not based
upon any alleged fault of an employer,7 ' and a manufacturer is not held
to respond solely for the acts of another.72
Similar reasoning would preclude a manufacturer from recovering
from an employer on a theory of active/passive negligence. A party may
seek indemnity from another if there is a large disparity between the kind
of negligence committed by the two parties and if the party's own fault
was merely "passive" while the other party's fault was "active." "Ac-
tive" negligence denotes some positive act or an omission that is the
equivalent of a positive act.73 "Passive" negligence denotes the failure to
do something that should have been done.74 A manufacturer, under this
theory, would argue that its negligence in selling a defective machine was
passive, while the negligence of the employer in refusing the safety device
was the active negligence that caused the injury. 75 Once again, however,
the nature of the manufacturer's liability prevents successful use of this
argument. In a products liability action a manufacturer is held strictly
69. The recognition of a special legal relationshp was proposed by Judge Stein in his dissent in
Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 207, 510 A.2d at 1167.
70. Nadeau v. Melin, 260 Minn. 369, 375-76, 110 N.W.2d 29, 34 (1961).
71. See, eg., White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir. 1981) (In a prod-
ucts liability action under admiralty law, a manufacturer cannot characterize any resulting liability
as secondary to any alleged fault of an employer.).
72. See eg., Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 NJ. 55, 79, 159 A.2d 97, 109
(1960) (An owner of an aircraft is entitled to indemnity if he is free of fault and the liability of
another merely imputed to him.).
73. 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 1(14) (1966).
74. Id.
75. For a general example of this kind of argument, see White, 662 F.2d at 246-47.
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liable for an injury caused by an unreasonably dangerous product.76
Such liability is viewed as active liability because the manufacturer "ac-
tively" designed and marketed the product77 and cannot claim that it
merely "passively" failed to discover a preexisting defect.78 In other
words, for the purpose of indemnification, courts equate strict products
liability with active negligence.79 Therefore, indemnity would not be
available to a manufacturer under an active/passive negligence theory.
Even if indemnification through an active/passive negligence theory
were available to a manufacturer, a court would first have to find the
employer negligent toward the employee. This finding requires liability
in tort.80 Workers' compensation statutes preclude finding an employer
liable in tort to an employee. 81 Therefore, theories of vicarious liability
and active versus passive negligence have no application to a manufac-
turer seeking indemnity from an employer who thwarted the manufac-
turer's curative attempts.
2. Independent Duty-Contractual or Special Legal Relationship.
Another claim for implied indemnity arises when one party owes a duty
to another party and the breach of that duty is separable from the tor-
tious conduct to the original plaintiff.8 2 This duty, either based in con-
tract8 3 or in tort,8 4 carries with it the obligation to indemnify.85 In those
76. See, eg., Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 60, 200 Cal. Rptr.
136, 147 (1984) (quoting Dart Transp. Serv. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 837, 849, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 670, 678 (1970)).
77. See, e.g., White, 662 F.2d at 250 (failure to warn of defective product is active fault); Swin-
dlehurst v. Resistance Welder Corp., 110 Mich. App. 693, 698, 313 N.W.2d 191, 194 (1981) (active
fault of manufacturer exists in design and/or manufacture of machine).
78. Cf. Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 116-17, 192 N.E.2d 167, 170,
242 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (1963) (generally landlord only passively negligent when failing to discover
and remedy dangerous condition affirmatively created by another).
79. See, e.g., Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 324-25, 144 N.W.2d
303, 309 (1966) (manufacturer's failure to make product nondangerous is active and not passive
negligence); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 493, 378 A.2d 53, 64 (1977) ("If
defendants are found liable in strict liability, it will be because of their conduct in [actively] manufac-
turing or distributing a defective product .... ").
80. Slattery v. Marra Bros. Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir.) (When a worker under an employ-
ment contract surrendered rights to recovery except for workers' compensation, a tenant was not
entitled to indemnity from a stevedore for damages the worker recovered from the tenant.), cert
denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951); Iowa Power, 259 Iowa at 323, 144 N.W.2d at 309 (requirement of
concurrent negligence bars indemnification claims under workers' compensation based on active/
passive negligence).
81. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
83. See, eg., Arcidiacono v. Wilmington Finishing Co., No. 84C-AU-86 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.
10, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del file), cert. denied, 516 A.2d 482 (Del. 1986). This contract
may be expressed or implied but typically requires an employer to undertake some service or per-
form some act for a manufacturer. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.72, at 14-716 to 14-717.
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states that allow some kinds of implied indemnity claims, manufacturers
may maintain claims for indemnity despite the exclusive-remedy provi-
sion of workers' compensation. Because an employer's liability arises out
of the breach of an independent duty owed to a manufacturer and not out
of an employee's injury, the exclusive-remedy provision does not apply.86
A manufacturer does not enjoy a special relationship with the em-
ployer based solely on the contract of sale. A contrary rule would re-
quire the courts to imply a duty of employers to use the purchased
product in such a way so as not to expose sellers to liability.8 7 Courts
have consistently refused to imply a duty of care that "flows upstream
from the purchaser [of a product] to the manufacturer, 88 because this
holding would negate the very purpose of products liability law.8 9
Although other contracts between manufacturers and employers may
Some courts confuse the boundaries between an implied contract and a special legal relation-
ship. An implied contract should properly be viewed as one set of circumstances which gives rise to
a special relationship (here contractual) and the implied promise to indemnify. Some courts, how-
ever, will recognize a special relationship between the parties only when it is contractual in nature,
that is, when one party specifically undertakes to perform some act or service for the other party.
Failure to separate the specific types of indemnity claims that may legally exist has unnecessarily
narrowed the field of recovery for manufacturers with legitimate claims against employers. See infra
notes 133-45 and accompanying text. For a good overview of the different kinds of indemnity claims
available, see Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., 103 NJ. 194, 207-12, 510 A.2d 1161, 1167-70 (1986)
(Stein, J., dissenting).
84. See, eg., Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 207-08, 510 A.2d at 1168 (Stein, J., dissenting); Syden-
stricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W. Va. 440, 445, 288 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1982) (quoting Hill v.
Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W. Va. 22, 27, 268 S.E.2d 296, 301 (1980)). This duty is some-
times expressed by courts as an "implied indemnity contract" between the parties. See, eg., Hill v.
Sullivan Equip. Co., 86 Mich. App. 693, 697-98, 273 N.W.2d 527, 529 (1978).
85. Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 207-08, 510 A.2d at 1167-68 (Stein, J., dissenting). This duty may
also arise between the parties based on their legal relationship. Id. at 208-11, 510 A.2d at 1168-69
(discussing principal/agent, bailee/bailor, and employer/contractor relationships as examples).
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 130 (1956) (noting shipowners' rights to recover from indemnitor based on
independent contractual right not related to employee's injury); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d
143, 152, 282 N.E.2d 288, 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 390 (1972) (The plaintiff-manufacturer suing the
defendant-employer "asserts its own right of recovery for breach of an ... independent duty...
owed to it by the defendant." (quoting Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester Co. S.E. Corp., 278
N.Y. 175, 179, 15 N.E.2d 567, 568 (1938))).
87. See, eg., Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010, 1018-19 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 584
F.2d 1124 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J.
Super. 471, 490, 378 A.2d 53, 63 (1977); Olch v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 19 Wash. App. 89, 93-94,
573 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1978); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.84, at 14-751.
88. Decker v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 389 Mass. 35, 39, 449 N.E. 2d 641, 644 (1983) (quot-
ing William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 634, 348 A.2d 716, 718 (1975)).
89. For example, the Star Chopper court explained "[alt first blush, we appear to be moving in a
circle, imposing liability on the manufacturer on the one hand and excusing it on the other through
the indemnity contract." 442 F. Supp. at 1021; see also Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153
Cal. App. 3d 45, 60-61, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136, 147 (1984) (implied indemnity against public policy of
strict liability).
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create the special relationship that imposes the obligation to indemnify,
such an obligation is not imposed on employers through a simple bill of
sale.
The special relationship also may be imposed by law. Although sale
of a machine, by itself, does not create a special legal relationship be-
tween a manufacturer and an employer, such a relationship is not pre-
cluded. Several courts have stated in dicta that under appropriate
circumstances, an employer/manufacturer relationship will impose the
obligation to indemnify.90 These courts recognize indemnity as an equi-
table principle imposed by "law to prevent a result which is regarded as
unjust or unsatisfactory." 91 Indemnity has been characterized as "a
shifting of responsibility from the shoulders of one person to another;
and the duty to indemnify has been recognized in cases where equities
supported it."92 Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the relationship be-
tween a manufacturer and an employer is such that the law should im-
pose upon the employer some duty to the manufacturer to allow the
manufacturer to cure defective products.93
a. Imposing a "duty. " The concept of a "duty" is merely a legal
convenience. A "duty" is "a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather
than an aid to analysis in itself"'94 and expresses those policy considera-
tions that "lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protec-
tion." 95 Once a "duty" is recognized as desirable, the courts simply
work backward to find a special legal relationship between the two par-
ties.96 If the circumstances warrant the recognition of a special relation-
90. Star Chopper, 442 F. Supp. at 1018-19; Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181,
1184 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Hill v. Sullivan Equip. Co., 86 Mich. App. 693, 698, 273 N.W.2d
527, 529 (1978) (recognizing potential of special relationship between manufacturer and employer).
91. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 51, at 341.
92. Id. § 51, at 344; cf Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 291-92 (1972) (right to apportionment or full indemnity should rest on relative re-
sponsibility and be determined by facts).
93. Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., 103 N.J. 194, 201, 510 A.2d 1161, 1170 (1986) (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
94. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 54, at 358; cf Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d
270, 290, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767, 778 (1981) ("[T]he concept of duty is simply a shorthand way of
expressing whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to protection against the defendant's con-
duct."); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 406, 591 P.2d 719, 722 (1979) (same).
95. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 54, at 358; see also Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1023-26 (1928) (In imposing "duty," a court is deciding
whether defendant must "bear the risk or whether plaintiff must bear his own loss."); Dumka v.
Quaderer, 151 Mich. App. 68, 72, 390 N.W.2d 200, 202 (1986) ("[A] duty may be defined as an
obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of
conduct toward another." Existence of such a duty is a question of law.).
96. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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ship, they also warrant the recognition of the imposition of the duty.97
Thus, the concept of an independent duty and the concept of a special
legal relationship merge. Both concepts describe the same result and are
simply terms of art used to justify a social decision as to who should bear
the loss in a given situation.98
To say that an employer has an independent duty to allow a manu-
facturer to cure a defect is to say, in effect, that in these situations a
manufacturer's interests are entitled to legal protection against an em-
ployer's conduct.99 It is therefore necessary to look into the policy con-
siderations for recognizing such a duty. When a manufacturer attempts
to cure a defective product and an employer frustrates these efforts, the
employer is the one who should bear the cost of injury. The employer
owes this obligation to the manufacturer because the manufacturer is
otherwise unable to discharge its own duty to correct the defect.
Strong policy considerations support the imposition of an independ-
ent duty upon employers to allow the correction of defects by manufac-
turers. First, a duty to provide a safe product is imposed on
manufacturers under products liability law. Manufacturers are responsi-
ble for the safety of their machines. 1 This obligation naturally helps to
maximize the safety of the workplace.101
97. Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 208-09, 510 A.2d at 1168 (Stein, J., dissenting) (special legal rela-
tionship gives rise to duty of indemnification); see also Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 147 (1932) (relationship between parties "often affords the
decisive clue" of what is fair); supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
98. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 53, at 357 (If "court should desire to find liabil-
ity, it would be quite as easy to find the necessary 'relation' (betwecn] ... the parties ... and hence to
extend the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.").
99. Id. § 53, at 358. Professor Leon Green has articulated five factors which play a role in
deciding whether a defendant owes a duty toward the plaintiff: (1) administrative (workability of the
decision), (2) moral, (3) economic, (4) preventative (ability of decision to control future conduct),
and (5) considerations of "justice." Green, supra note 95, at 1034.
Although each factor is not treated separately in this note, all the factors are satisfied in impos-
ing a duty on an employer to allow a manufacturer to cure defects. The imposition of the duty is
limited and narrow, thus allowing workability. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text. Pol-
icy considerations discussed supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text support both moral and
justice considerations. Imposition of the duty would also have positive economic results as discussed
supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text, and would also serve the function of preventing future
harms. See infra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Prosser, PasgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 15 (1953) ("There is a duty if the court says there is a duty" based on interplay of many
factors.); cf Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972) (liability
imposed for breach of duty means defendant has departed from required standard of conduct).
100. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
101. Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., 103 N.J. 194, 216, 510 A.2d 1161, 1172 (1986) (Stein, J.,
dissenting) (central focus of products liability to minimize accidents); see also Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 NJ. 402, 410, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972) (public interest in assuring that safety devices
installed demands manufacturer be responsible for installation).
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Second, employers are under a similar duty imposed both by the
common law and by statute to provide safe workplaces for employees.
The common law duty requires employers to conform to a certain stan-
dard of conduct to use and maintain machines in a non-negligent man-
ner.' 0 2 Additionally, Congress and most state legislatures have enacted
safety regulations requiring employers to furnish necessary protection de-
vices for the safety of their employees or to furnish a place of employ-
ment free from recognized hazards. 10 3 This duty runs from employers to
their employees and includes the duty of proper use and care of ma-
chines. °4 In practice, however, these common law and statutory duties
cannot adequately be enforced because workers' compensation removes
liability for their breach. 05 Although courts seem reluctant to recognize
102. Odom v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 378, 379 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
103. Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 215, 510 A.2d at 1172 (Stein, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the
Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1982), which "explicitly
recognizes the national policy favoring a safe workplace." Stephenson, 103 NJ. at 215, 510 A.2d at
1172 (Stein, J., dissenting). Section 654 of the OSHA requires "that employers 'furnish to ...
employees ... a place of employment... frec from recognized hazards. .. .' includ[ing] a dangerous
condition known to the employer." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982)).
Many states have similar safety statutes. Eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6403 (West Supp. 1988)
(Employers are charged with several duties including, "do[ing] every other thing reasonably neces-
sary to protect the life, safety, and health of employees."); CNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-370(a)
(West 1987) (Requiring that employers furnish "a place of employment which [isl free from recog-
nized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to [their] em-
ployees."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6A-3 (West 1987) ("Every employer shall install, maintain and use
such employee protective devices and safeguards... as are reasonably necessary to protect the life,
health and safety of employees ...."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129 (1987) ("Each employer shall
furnish... a place of employment free from recognized hazards .... ); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5182(a) § 3 (Vernon 1987) ("Every employer shall furnish and maintain... a place of employ-
ment which shall be reasonably safe and healthful for employees.").
104. See, e.g., Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010, 1018-19 (D.R.I. 1977) (employer's
duty of proper use and care of machine runs solely to its employees), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) ; Duke v. Gulf& Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 416
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (breach of employer's duty imposed by safety statute is no defense to manufac-
turer; instead it means only both parties failed to adequately safeguard machine); Mitchell, supra
note 12, at 376 (willful failure to install safety device is breach of employer's obligation to employee).
105. See Mitchell, supra note 12, at 376. Because employers have no statutory or common law
liability under workers' compensation, these safety regulations do not subject employers to such
liability. Instead, if the regulations are violated, they operate to increase the workers' compensation
award by a certain percentage, up to 100%. As Mitchell points out, however, this extra payment is
still quite inadequate as compensation to the employee and is far less than he would receive if work-
ers' compensation were not in operation.
Mitchell has suggested that federal and state safety regulatious could form the basis of the
independent duty between the employer and the manufacturer. The employer would owe a duty to
the manufacturer not to violate any of these laws. The employer would be fully liable to the manu-
facturer for a breach of a safety regulation which caused an increase in liability to the manufacturer.
Therefore, such a duty would supply the needed mechanism for meaningful enforccment of these
regulations. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 384; see also General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780, 787-
89 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960); Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218,
222 (2d Cir. 1941).
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a duty running from employers to manufacturers based on safety regula-
tions,106 the policies behind these regulations manifest a strong public
interest in a safe workplace.10 7
Workers' compensation was not enacted to remove all incentive
from employers to prevent employee injury. An employer may not will-
fully or intentionally injure an employee.108 In such instances, an em-
ployee is able to fie a complaint against her employer despite the
operation of workers' compensation. Filing an action is allowed because
an injury of this type is said to have lost its accidental character.10 9 Will-
fully subjecting an employee to dangerous work conditions might be con-
sidered an intentional tort that would entitle an employee to extra
recovery.110 Thus, when an employer intentionally committed the act
which injures an employee, that employer cannot allege the injury was
accidental and is covered by workers' compensation. 1 Such an argu-
ment would seem to have equal force when an employer intentionally
prevents a manufacturer from correcting an unsafe machine. The major-
ity of courts, however, require a direct intent to inflict injury; negligent or
reckless conduct does not allow employees directly to recover full dam-
106. Courts that have had to confront this issue have held that state and federal safety statutes
were created for the benefit of the employee and thus create no cognizable relationship between the
manufacturer and employer. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Denying third-party recovery based on safety statutes is unpersuasive. Courts could find that
although the statutes were created for the benefit of the employee, their existence nonetheless im-
poses a duty on the employer not to violate them in ways that would injure third parties. See
Mitchell, supra note 12, at 384; cf Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 253, 258-64, 447 N.E.2d
717, 719-23, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776-80 (1983) (rejecting implied indemnification but finding town
proportionately liable to hotel based on town's breach of safety regulations which caused damage to
third parties).
107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. These regnlations recognize either explicitly or
implicitly that at least some responsibility for a safe workplace properly belongs to employers. See,
eg., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2) (1982) ("[E]mployers and
employees have separate but dependent responsibilities and rights with respect to achieving safe and
healthful working conditions .... ."); CAL. LAB. CODE § 6423 (West Supp. 1988) (penalties set out
for employers who violate safety regulations); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-382 (West 1987)
(same).
108. Davis v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 596 F. Supp. 780, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (Workers' compen-
sation does not preclude common law remedies for intentional torts by an employer.); Note, Excep-
tions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1641, 1650 (1983) (Many "courts find it unacceptable to immunize employers from bearing full tort
damages for intentional injuries.").
109. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 705, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978); 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.00, at 13-1.
110. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 355-56 (penalty statutes provide for substantial increase in work-
ers' compensation benefits or for suit at common law to recover for entire injury upon proof of
willful misconduct or injury by employer); Note, supra note 108, at 1650-51 (Tort action is permit-
ted as an alternative to workers' compensation remedy for intentional injury by employers.).
111. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.11, at 13-2, 13-3 n.l (citing cases explaining that work-
ers' compensation covers only "accidental" injuries).
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ages from employers.1 12 Nonetheless, allowing recoveries for the inten-
tional misfeasance of employers supports the idea that employers have a
certain responsibility to maintain safety in the workplace, a responsibility
for which they may be held accountable.113
Considering the duties of safety placed separately on both employers
and manufacturers, the full implementation of legislative policies con-
cerning safety in the workplace dictates that a duty between employers
and manufacturers also be recognized. 114 Both manufacturers and em-
ployers are committed to maintaining a safe work environment,115 but
neither can fully perform their duties without the cooperation of the
other.1 16 The law should not force manufacturers to wait helplessly for
injury to occur-injury for which a manufacturer may be held responsi-
ble. If the law imposes a duty on manufacturers to perform certain obli-
gations, it should also recognize the manufacturers' right to do that
which the law requires. It would be counterproductive to impose strict
liability on manufacturers to maximize safety in the workplace and yet
allow employers, who are also responsible for safety in the workplace, to
forestall manufacturers' efforts to cure. 117 Likewise, it is paradoxical to
create safety regulations for employers and not to enforce them in any
meaningful way.118
Placing the duty on employers to cooperate with manufacturers not
only upholds legislative intent but also furthers the public interest in a
safe workplace. Besides the obvious desire to foster safe and productive
work environments, the public would realize an economic benefit. Prod-
ucts liability is a judicial policy decision to place the cost of injury on the
manufacturer, who passes this cost indirectly to the public through the
prices charged for goods. Risk of injury becomes part of the cost of do-
112. Id. § 68.13, at 13-8 to 13-9; see Hildebrandt v. Whirlpool Corp., 364 N.W.2d 394, 396-97
(Minn. 1985).
113. Some courts have allowed recovery when the intent to injure has been indirect, but these
instances are rare. See, eg., Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. at 706, 246 S.E.2d at 914. This area of workers'
compensation shows that courts have had trouble balancing legislative intent with obvious misfea-
sance of employers.
114. These policies include allowing employees to sue manufacturers for products liability under
workers' compensation acts and enacting safety statutes to make employers responsible for safe
workplaces. See supra notes 5, 103-04 and accompanying text.
115. The manufacturer is committed through § 402A Strict Product Liability, see supra note 10
and accompanying text, and the employer through the OSHA and state safety statutes, see supra
note 103 and aecompanying text.
116. An employer must naturally rely on manufacturer's cxpertise and judgment when purchas-
ing machines. A manufacturer, in turn, requires minimal cooperation from an employer in order to
inspect machines and to correct any defeets he subsequently may discover. The manufacturer is, of
course, responsible for all associated costs, including downtime.
117. Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 217, 510 A.2d at 1173 (Stein, J., dissenting).
118. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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ing business.1 19 When a manufacturer discovers a defect in a product, it
normally has an incentive to remove the defect in order to lessen its expo-
sure to potential liability.120 If a manufacturer must go through an ex-
tensive campaign to cure defective machines, and is met by an
uncooperative employer, it may become more cost efficient to retain the
risk of liability than to continue to try to convince the employer of the
wisdom of installing the curative device.121 This is especially true when
the employer has no external incentive to cooperate. Thus, under the
present system, needless accidents occur, and the public pays for them in
both increased prices and injured bodies.
From a social standpoint, therefore, a duty between employers and
manufacturers is the desired solution. Imposing a duty on employers
creates an incentive for employers to weigh more carefully and realisti-
cally the benefit of the curative device against the inconvenience of instal-
lation or the cost of reduced production.1 22 Manufacturers retain the
motivation to be persistent in trying to cure because persistence may play
an important role in later efforts to recover from employers.1 23 The im-
position of a duty to cooperate would result in a net reduction of injury;
fewer injuries mean less cost to the public.
b. Requiring independence and severability. If a duty is in-
dependent and severable from the duty employers owe to their employ-
ees, then it is outside the workers' compensation scheme, and damages
for its breach are recoverable.1 24 Imposing a duty on employers to allow
manufacturers to cure defects is consistent with both the independence
and severability requirements. This duty, however, would not arise when
an employer breaches a duty to an employee and is concurrently negli-
gent with the manufacturer.1 25 In this case the duty is neither independ-
ent nor severable.
119. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
120. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 375-76 (negatively implying that if corrective attempts would
decrease liability, manufacturers normally would undertake them); Note, supra note 108, at 1646
(When the cost of accidents both in compensation and prevention is borne by one party, "that
party's incentive to reduce its expenses will lead it to take cost-effective safety measures.").
121. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 375-76.
122. See supra note 120; cf 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 70.20, at 13-231, 13-232 (workers'
compensation acts usually neglect objective of placing ultimate loss on actual wrongdoer, thereby
losing deterrent effect); Mitchell, supra note 12, at 383 (neither safety statutes nor workers' compen-
sation result in deterrence of wrongful conduct which is essential purpose of tort liability system).
123. Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 216-18, 510 A.2d at 1172-73 (Stein, J., dissenting) (whether manu-
facturer persistently frustrated in efforts to cure and whether employer thus breached independent
duty to manufacturer would be determined by jury).
124. See supra notes 68, 86 and accompanying text.
125. For examples of concurrent employer/manufacturer negligence, see cases cited supra note
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An employer owes no duty to a manufacturer to use the manufac-
turer's product safely. For example, if a machine is found to be unrea-
sonably dangerous when a safety guard is removed, an employer's act of
removing the guard is the very danger that causes its unreasonably dan-
gerous condition. 126 The legal question is whether the manufacturer,
when designing the machine, should have foreseen that the guard would
be removed. In this situation, the manufacturer retains liability consis-
tent with the goal of products liability, which is to induce manufacturers
to desigu their products to be as safe as possible. 127 The employer's ac-
tions are part of the use or misuse of the machine, and the employer owes
a duty to the employee, not the manufacturer, to use the machine in a
safe manner.128
When a manufacturer has tried to the best of its ability to create a
safe machine, that manufacturer has acted consistently with the purpose
of products liability. If a defect is nonetheless discovered after the
machine is placed in the market, the manufacturer incurs a duty to cure
the defect, and will remain responsible for any resulting injury regardless
of its original good-faith efforts. 129 Any attempt by the manufacturer to
cure a defect is therefore an attempt to remove already-existing potential
liability. By persistently frustrating the manufacturer's attempts, an em-
ployer prevents the manufacturer from removing the dormant liability.
Unlike the example of removing a guard, the employer's actions are not a
manifestation of the potential liability; rather they prevent a separate,
already-existing liability from being extinguished. This distinction is sig-
nificant. When a manufacturer tries to cure a defect, 130 an employer's
refusal is not part of what makes the manufacturer originally liable but
rather creates a second and separate issue.131 Thus, the duty involves
126. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
127. See Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 216, 510 A.2d at 1172 (Stein, J., dissenting) (products liability
decisions encourage the optimum investment in safety); see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Likewise, the employer is under no obligation
to cure a defect himself. Mitchell notes:
To ask a purchaser to install a device that a manufacturer in his superior design experience
thinks unnecessary is to ask that purchaser to spend money on an item of dubious value. It
is only when the manufacturer has taken all reasonable steps to convince the purchaser of
the necessity for installing the device that a shift in responsibility should even be consid-
ered.
Mitchell, supra note 12, at 375; see Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 761-62 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(employer had no statutory duty to install guard and manufacturer had no reason to expect em-
ployer to do so); cf Lehn v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 400 So. 2d 317, 321-22 (La. Ct. App.)
(manufacturer of motor home not entitled to indemnification from dealer because dealer failed to
notify manufacturer or remedy defects), cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 608 (La. 1981).
129. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
130. For instance, by offering to weld on guards that were previously screwed on.
131. As further illnstration, suppose an employer is warned of the danger of removing a safety
guard and is asked to allow the manufacturer to weld the guard to the machine. The employer
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only the interactions of employers and manufacturers.
Because the law imposes a duty on manufacturers to correct the
dangerous condition of a machine, manufacturers should have the right
to discharge this duty.132 In blocking curative steps, employers infringe
on this right and should have to answer for this infringement. Thus, an
employer's interference can be conceived as the breach of a duty owed to
a manufacturer-a duty that exists regardless of employee injury. Equity
should permit a manufacturer to obtain a court order to force a recalci-
trant employer to allow the manufacturer to install a needed safety de-
vice before an injury occurs. The duty to allow manufacturers to take
curative steps involves only minimal cooperation with manufacturers and
has nothing to do with employers' duties to their employees.
c. The fault requirement and judicial recognition of the special rela-
tionship. Although recognition of a special relationship between an em-
ployer and a manufacturer is strongly supported by policy and equity, no
court has yet recognized its existence.1 33 This hesitancy exists for two
reasons. First, many courts have confused the idea of indemnity arising
from a special relationship with the idea of indemnity based on vicarious
liability or passive negligence. Thus, these courts hold that indemnifica-
tion based on a special relationship between a manufacturer and an em-
ployer can exist only if the manufacturer-the indemnitee-is liable
without personal fault.134 Because a manufacturer's liability is consid-
ered active, a manufacturer is always at fault to some degree. Therefore,
in the view of these courts, a manufacturer can never be in a special
refuses because the guard is awkward and he wishes to retain the ability to remove it. Subsequently,
the employer does remove the guard and an employee is injured. The employer's act of removing the
guard breached a duty owed to the employee to provide a safe workplace. His earlier action of
refusing curative measures by the manufacturer breached a duty owed to the manufacturer to allow
the defect to be corrected.
132. On the other hand, manufacturers should be denied the ability to shift responsibility to
employers when they make no effort to provide safety devices or emphasize the need for them. "The
very action upon which the manufacturer bases his request for a release from liability is a foreseeable
consequence of the manufacturer's original failure to make available such a device." Mitchell, supra
note 12, at 375 (emphasis added).
133. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 384.
134. Bullock v. Black & Decker, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Houdaille In-
dus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 493 (Fla. 1979); Decker v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 389
Mass. 35, 40,449 N.E.2d 641, 644-45 (1983); Kirin v. Rise Eng'g Co., 148 Mich. App. 278, 282, 384
N.W.2d 149, 151 (1986) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Jones & Lamson, 144 Mich. App. 91, 97, 373
N.W.2d 249, 252 (1985), vacated, 424 Mich. 890, 381 N.W.2d 729 (1986)); Stephenson v. R.A. Jones
& Co., 103 N.J. 194, 200, 510 A.2d 1161, 1164 (1986); Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169
W. Va. 440, 445-46, 288 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1982).
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relationship vis-a-vis another culpable party. 135 Second, courts appear
hesitant to enforce a relationship that has not been traditionally recog-
nized. Some courts fear that such an exception to the exclusive-remedy
provision would be merely a judicial contrivance to circumvent the ex-
clusive-remedy provision of workers' compensation. 136 This reluctance
seems to stem from "an unwillingness to tamper with what courts see as
the fixed terms of the carefully designed legislative bargain underlying
workers' compensation."'137 Neither of these reasons, however, prohibit
recognizing a special relationship between a manufacturer and an
employer.
A special legal relationship may be implied without requiring that
the one seeking indemnity be totally free from fault.' 38 When discussing
the right to indemnity, several courts have correctly treated the disparity
of fault requirement and the existence of a special legal relationship as
separate inquiries. These courts recognize that the potential theories of
recovery are not interdependent. 139 Those courts requiring both factors
misunderstand the development of indemnity and the circumstances
under which it will be imposed. 14° As Professor Keeton stated in The
Law of Torts, "the principle [of indemnity] is not... limited to those
135. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text; see also, eg., Grayson v. Chambersburg
Eng'g Co., 139 Mich. App. 456, 462, 362 N.W.2d 751, 754-55 (1984) (no indemnification under
theory of implied agreement to negligent party).
136. See, eg., Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 199, 510 A.2d at 1163.
137. Note, supra note 108, at 1654.
138. Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 208-09, 510 A.2d at 1168 (Stein, J., dissenting); cf Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 282 N.E.2d 288, 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 388 (1972) (indemnity can
apply when one party less culpable than another although both liable to person injured).
139. Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1978) (indemnity available when
one tortfeasor actively and the other passively negligent, or where special relationship exists between
parties); Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 534 F.2d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 1976) (indemnity allowed if
breach of independent duty or if vicarious or passive negligence of third party compared to active
negligence of employer); Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1974) (In
absence of special legal relationship or indemnity contract, liability is shifted only when it is more
just to shift the burden-when the indemnitor is more at fault.); Ranta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 287
F. Supp. 111, 112-13 (D. Conn. 1968) (indemnity available when one tortfeasor actively and the
other passively negligent, or where speeial relationship exists between parties); Burgdorff v. Interna-
tional Business Machs., 35 Ill. App. 3d 192, 194, 341 N.E.2d 122, 124-25 (1975) (to invoke implied
indemnity must show either preexisting relationship or qualitative difference between negligence of
two parties); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 322-23, 144 N.W.2d 303,
308-09 (1966) (indemnity permitted when right arises out of separate duty due third party from
employer); Olch v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 19 Wash. App. 89, 93, 573 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1978)
("Indemnity may be permitted on the basis of an express contract, by virtue of vicarious liability,
because of a breach of an independent duty between the indemnitor and the indemnitee, and because
of the primary or 'active' tortious oanduct of an indemnitor as compared to the secondary or 'pas-
sive' tortious conduct of the indemnitee.").
140. Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 200, 510 A.2d at 1170 (Stein, J., dissenting). The majority of courts
have required that manufacturers must be wholly without fault. See, eg., Houdaille Indus., Inc. v.
Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 492-93 (Fla. 1979); Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus., 103 N.J. 177, 188-
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who are personally free from fault. ' 141 A finding that a manufacturer is
liable under a theory of products liability should not prevent courts from
recognizing a special relationship carrying with it the obligation to
indemnify.
In addition, courts should not hesitate to enforce a legal duty be-
tween a manufacturer and an employer simply because it is a new rela-
tionship that lacks precedent. 142 All special legal relationships can be
traced back to some policy decision. 143 Tort principles have always been
broad and expansive, responding to new situations and developments in
society.144 Because of changes in the law after workers' compensation
was enacted, courts can and should consider the exclusive-remedy rule in
light of modem circumstances and recognize exceptions when applica-
ble.145 In light of the general statutory scheme promoting safety in the
workplace and the important public policy behind this scheme, courts
should recognize those exceptions that do not subvert workers' compen-
sation and that advance the desired goal of a safe workplace.
CONCLUSION
A literal application of the workers' compensation exclusive-remedy
provision extends that provision beyond its intended use-controlling the
recoveries and liabilities between employers and employees. In those
states where implied indemnity claims are recognized, failure to include a
special legal relationship between the manufacturer and the employer has
created an unauthorized safe harbor for employers and eliminates poten-
tially valid claims by third parties, such as those of a manufacturer frus-
91, 510 A.2d 1152, 1158-59 (1986); Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W. Va. 440,445-47,
288 S.E.2d 511, 515-16 (1982).
141. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 51, at 342; see also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 76.72 (right of indemnity may still exist when fault of indemnitee is relatively minor). Professor
Larson also implicitly recognizes that some circumstances exist in which the fault of the third party
is not merely constructive. He states that cases recognizing an independent relationship between the
parties usually involve the constructive or imputed negligence of one party with the genuine negli-
gence of the other party. He does not, however, suggest that imputed negligence is an absolute
requirement. Larson, supra note 52, at 506.
142. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 384, 395-96.
143. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 70, at 500 (Vicarious liability is a "rule of
policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk"); id. § 75, at 536-37 (Strict liability may be imposed by
asking, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the loss.). These forms of
liability are the ones that most often create special legal relationships, i.e., principal held vicariously
liable for agent, bailor held strictly liable for injury caused by product (in control of bailee), lessor
liable for injuries caused by property defects even when landlord promises to repair (even though
property in lessee's control), manufacturer held strictly liable for failure to cure (even though prod-
uct is in employer's control).
144. See, ag., Note, supra note 108, at 1645.
145. Id. at 1653-60.
1119Vol. 1987:1095]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
trated in attempts to cure. Noncontractual implied indemnity should
exist when an employer refuses to allow a manufacturer to cure defective
products.
When faced with an uncooperative employer, courts should look at
the entire legislative scheme concerning the workplace and conclude that
an independent duty exists between manufacturers and employers to al-
low manufacturers to cure defective products. It is doubtful that legisla-
tures ever meant employer immunization to cover those situations when
an employer, due to self-interest or disregard for the safety of employees,
actually prevents a manufacturer from discharging the duty imposed by
products liability to correct safety defects. 146 Surely the legislature did
not intend that a legal duty imposed on one party could be obstructed by
the conduct of another party without repercussion.
Employers owe manufacturers an independent duty to cooperate
minimally in curing defective machines, regardless of whether an em-
ployee is injured. In the case of litigation, the question of whether an
employer frustrated the attempt to cure and the question of a manufac-
turer's good-faith and reasonable attempt to cure should be submitted to
the jury to determine whether the independent duty has been breached.
If such a breach has occurred, a manufacturer should be able to claim
indemnity. This duty arises ouly when a manufacturer has taken affirma-
tive action to correct defects and ouly imposes on an employer the obli-
gation to allow the corrective measures.
Recognizing a special legal relationship between a manufacturer and
an employer promotes the public interest in a safe workplace and maxi-
mizes efforts toward achieving safety. Manufacturers will still attempt,
146. For example, the Supreme Court found the legislative history of the Federal Employee
Compensation Act to reveal Congress's intent in enacting the exclusive-remedy provision:
"The purpose... is to make it clear that the right to compensation benefits under the
act is exclusive and in place of any and all other legal liability of the United States ....
"Workmen's Compensation laws, in general, specify that the remedy therein provided
shall be the exclusive remedy. The basic theory supporting all workmen's compensation
legislation is that the remedy afforded is a substitute for the employee's (or dependent's)
former remedy at law for damages against the employer... The inadequacy of the benefits
under the Employees' Compensation Act has tended to cause Federal employees to seek
relief under these general statutes....
"This situation has been of considerable concern to all Government agencies and espe-
cially to the corporate instrumentalities. Since the proposed remedy would afford employ-
ees and their dependents a planned and substantial protection, to permit other remedies by
civil action or suits would not only be unnecessary, but would in general be uneconomical,
from the standpoint of both the beneficiaries involved and the Government."
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 601 n.5 (1963) (quoting S. REP. No. 836, 81st
Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1949) (emphasis added)).
The Supreme Court interpreted this legislative history to indicate that in enacting the Compen-
sation Act, Congress was not concerned with the "rights of unrelated third parties, much less of any
purpose to disturb settled doctrines of... law affecting [their] mutual rights and liabilities." Id. at
601.
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in the first instance, to make machines as safe as possible because this
relationship does not relieve them from any liability for undiscovered de-
fects. When and if a defect is subsequently discovered, a manufacturer
would be held to a standard of reasonableness and good-faith in any at-
tempts to cure; the manufacturer must take affirmative action and that
action must be refused before its liability will be excused. This standard
provides the needed incentive both to correct the defect and to make sure
that safety devices are installed. An employer is faced with the threat of
a large damage verdict if she refuses the manufacturer's devices or re-
fuses to allow them to be installed by the manufacturer. The duty to
cooperate consists simply of not preventing the manufacturer from carry-
ing out certain obligations. Employees will benefit from fewer injuries
and a safer working environment. In the event injury does occur, an
employee preserves all rights and privileges.
The principles of indemnity and the idea of duty are flexible enough
to allow the recognition of a special relationship between a manufacturer
and an employer in this limited situation. By imposing a special relation-
ship, courts will be able to administer the law in a fair and just manner,
and at the same time, uphold the legislative intent behind workers' com-
pensation. Courts should feel obligated to protect a manufacturer's right
to discharge a duty imposed on it by law. Protecting this right will, in
the long run, protect workers as well as the society that orginally im-
posed the duty.
Karen M. Moran
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